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95 N.C. L. REV. 1767 (2017)

CONFUSION DEMANDS CLARITY: A SHORT,
COMPLICATED HISTORY OF CONTRACTBASED FRAUD CLAIMS IN NORTH
CAROLINA*
INTRODUCTION
In a contract, an integration clause or waiver of reliance indicates
the parties agree that the contract represents their complete
agreement.1 Thus, contradictory information from outside of the
contract typically cannot be used to determine the scope of the
parties’ agreement.2 In North Carolina, the courts have provided
unclear guidance on whether integration clauses can completely
preclude fraud claims based on representations made outside of the
contract. Even when contracts are fully integrated and the parties
explicitly agree that neither of them is relying on representations
made outside of that contract, North Carolina courts have differed
when deciding whether or not to allow extra-contractual
representations to serve as the basis for fraud claims.
This Recent Development is centered on two North Carolina
Business Court cases: Wedderburn Corp. v. Jetcraft Corp.3 and Vestlyn
BMP, LLC v. Balsam Mt. Group, LLC.4 Both opinions involved a
motion to dismiss a fraud claim, but they differed in their treatment of
extra-contractual statements. The Wedderburn court did not allow
extra-contractual representations to serve as the basis for a fraud
claim, while the Vestlyn court did allow extra-contractual statements
to serve as the basis for a fraud claim.
The differing conclusions in Wedderburn and Vestlyn appear to
arise from two seemingly distinct ideologies that the North Carolina
Business Court applied in the decisions. In Wedderburn, the court
followed a lineage of cases that gives integration clauses more power
to defend against fraud claims based on statements made outside of

* © 2017 J. William Graebe.
1. See 14A STRONG’S N.C. INDEX 4th, Evidence and Witnesses § 1896 (2017).
2. See id.
3. No. 15 CVS 757, 2015 WL 6951549 (N.C. Business Ct. Nov. 6, 2015)
(unpublished).
4. No. 15 CVS 386, 2016 WL 3883652 (N.C. Business Ct. June 22, 2016)
(unpublished).
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the contract. In Vestlyn, the court followed a lineage of cases that
allows parol evidence, or evidence outside of a contract, to support a
fraud claim.
The reason for the North Carolina Business Court’s differing
conclusions in Wedderburn and Vestlyn is unclear. In Vestlyn, the
court explained its decision to choose the standard from one lineage
over the other as being based on the procedural stage in which the
case was decided.5 However, because both Vestlyn and Wedderburn
were rulings on motions to dismiss, this reasoning does not fully
explain the differing outcomes. Because there is no clear distinction
between these cases, it is unclear what the standard is for determining
whether an integration clause will be held to preclude extracontractual evidence. This uncertainty creates significant problems
for contract drafters, and the creation of a new standard may be
required to remedy the issue.
Analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the two
lineages that led to the North Carolina Business Court’s differing
rulings in Wedderburn and Vestlyn. Part II analyzes the problem that
the differing opinions in Wedderburn and Vestlyn present to North
Carolina courts. Part III offers potential solutions to this problem,
including a factor test for courts to use when evaluating written
agreements, as well as actions that can be taken by the legislature to
offer drafters more certainty regarding the effectiveness of waivers of
reliance on extra-contractual representations.
I. DIFFERING LINEAGES
The first lineage that will be discussed is the Wedderburn lineage.
This line of cases illustrates North Carolina courts’ enforcement of
express waivers of reliance on extra-contractual statements at varying
stages of litigation. Within this lineage, the courts have considered
written contracts to be the parties’ complete agreement and refused
to allow fraud claims based on evidence outside of the contract to
proceed. The second line of cases, the Vestlyn lineage, represents
North Carolina courts taking the opposite approach when ruling on
motions to dismiss. In this lineage, the courts have held that
integration clauses cannot serve as complete defenses to fraud claims,
and that evidence outside of the contract can be used as the basis for
a fraud claim.

5. See id. at *8.
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A. The Wedderburn Lineage
The North Carolina Court of Appeals laid the foundation for the
Wedderburn decision in 1992 when it decided Ace Inc. v. Maynard.6 In
Ace, the parties entered into a contract for Plaintiff to purchase an
airplane.7 Prior to the completion of the sale, Defendant required that
Plaintiff sign a one-page purchase agreement that contained the
following statement:
[p]urchasers [Ace, Incorporated] have been informed and
understand that this is a final sale, and that the aircraft, parts
and accessories, are being sold “AS IS” and “WHERE IS,” and
that
there
are
“NO
REPRESENTATIONS
OR
WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED AS TO ANY
MATTER WHATSOEVER, INCLUDING, WITHOUT [sic]
LIMITATION, THE CONDITION OF THE AIRCRAFT,
PARTS OR ACCESSORIES, ITS MERCHANTABILITY
OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE.”8
Shortly after signing the agreement and taking possession of the
plane, Plaintiff discovered several defects with the aircraft.9
Defendants refused to fix the defects, leaving Plaintiff to pay for the
repairs himself.10 As a result, Plaintiff brought a claim for fraud,
alleging that Defendants sold the aircraft with knowledge that it
possessed these defects.11 At trial, the court granted Defendants’
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and
Plaintiff appealed.12
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
grant of the motion for JNOV.13 The court’s analysis focused on two
issues: (1) the express language of the written agreement, and (2) the
evidentiary foundation of the fraud claim.14 The court’s opinion
contained the following language: “because [Plaintiff] effectively
agreed when he signed the Purchase Agreement that [D]efendants
made no representations whatsoever with regard to the plane,
[P]laintiff is unable to establish the making of a false

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

108 N.C. App. 241, 423 S.E.2d 504 (1992).
Id. at 242, 423 S.E.2d at 505.
Id. at 244, 423 S.E.2d at 506 (alterations in original) (bold added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 245, 423 S.E.2d at 507.
Id. at 250, 423 S.E.2d at 510.
Id. at 249–50, 423 S.E.2d at 509–10.
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representation.”15 This language suggests an enforcement of the nonreliance provision that Plaintiff signed prior to taking possession of
the plane.16 Because this was a ruling on a JNOV motion, the court
had at its disposal all of the evidence that had been gathered for the
case, including statements made outside of the contract. Still, the
court enforced the contract’s integration clause and held that the
clause prevented Defendant from making a claim based on extracontractual statements.
The cases following Ace were decided at progressively earlier
stages of litigation where evidence is less available and thus less
impactful in the courts’ decision-making. While each case in this
lineage tracks the foundational language of Ace, they show a steady
procedural shift further away from the trial stage, ultimately to the
motion to dismiss stage. Still, the courts consistently applied the
ruling from Ace that integration clauses preclude parties from
bringing fraud claims based on evidence outside of the contract. The
first case to begin this progression occurred in 2003 when the North
Carolina Court of Appeals decided Chleborowicz v. Johnson.17
In Chleborowicz, Defendant sold his boat to Plaintiff and the
parties entered into a written agreement.18 The agreement contained
the following language: “THIS VESSEL IS SOLD AS IS, WHERE
IS,
FREE
AND
CLEAR
OF
ALL
LIENS
AND
INDEBTEDNESS[.]”19 The agreement also stated, “Hull indicated
damage is not structural [and] is repaired to buyer’s satisfaction.”20
Seven months after the purchase of the boat, Plaintiff discovered “a
15. Id. at 249–50, 423 S.E.2d at 510 (emphasis in original). This language has been
cited multiple times by other North Carolina courts. See, e.g., Jackson v. Tim Maguire,
Inc., 226 N.C. App. 583, 741 S.E.2d 514 (2013) (unpublished table decision), 2013 WL
1616031, at *5; Chleborowicz v. Johnson, 160 N.C. App. 250, 584 S.E.2d 108 (2003)
(unpublished table decision), 2003 WL 21961386, at *3; Wedderburn Corp. v. Jetcraft
Corp., No. 15 CVS 757, 2015 WL 6951549, at *5 (N.C. Business Ct. Nov. 6, 2015)
(unpublished).
16. While the court appears to dismiss the fraud claim because the integration clause
precludes evidence from outside of the contract, the court also stated that even
considering the extra-contractual evidence, Plaintiff did not prove the elements of fraud.
Ace Inc., 108 N.C. App. at 249–50, 423 S.E.2d at 510 (“Moreover, plaintiff failed to
establish concealment of a material fact on the part of defendants because plaintiff
presented no evidence that defendants knew of any defects in the plane.”) As a result, it is
unclear from the court’s consideration of both the integration clause and the extracontractual evidence whether the integration clause was enough to dismiss the fraud claim
on its own.
17. 160 N.C. App. 250, 584 S.E.2d 108 (Aug. 18, 2003) (unpublished table decision),
2003 WL 21961386.
18. Id. at *1.
19. Id.
20. Id. at *3 (alterations in original).
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catastrophic failure of the underwater section of the hull” that ended
up costing Plaintiff more than $18,000.21 Plaintiff brought a claim for
fraud. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, and Plaintiff appealed.22 The North Carolina Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the fraud claim.23
In its opinion, the court extensively discussed Ace and noted that
the contract language in the two cases was similar.24 Using Ace as a
guide, the court viewed the integration clause in the contract along
with the lack of extra-contractual evidence that the Defendant made
any fraudulent statements.25 As in Ace, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the fraud claims.26
Thus, this shows the court applying the standards from Ace, which
was a ruling on a motion for JNOV, to a case on a motion for
summary judgment.
In Wedderburn, the North Carolina Business Court further
expanded this lineage of case law and applied the rule that extracontractual evidence cannot serve as the basis of a fraud claim to a
case in the motion to dismiss stage. Wedderburn involved the sale of
an aircraft.27 The parties entered into an Aircraft Purchase
Agreement (the “APA”) that contained a disclaimer stating that the
aircraft “was being sold ‘as is, where is, with all faults,’ disclaiming
any warranties, and waiving Seller’s liability for loss of business, lost
profit, or other consequential and special damages.”28 Upon
Defendant’s delivery of the aircraft to Plaintiff, the two parties
executed an Aircraft Delivery Receipt (the “Receipt”).29 The Receipt
contained a disclaimer that read:
Purchaser hereby acknowledges that the Aircraft satisfies all of
the requirements, terms and conditions of the [APA]. By
21. Id.
22. Id. at *1.
23. Id. at *5.
24. Id. at *3.
25. See id. In its analysis, the court both acknowledged the integration clause in the
contract and stated that there was no extra-contractual evidence that Defendant
committed fraud. Id. Even though the court dismissed the fraud claim, its discussion of the
extra-contractual evidence proving fraud makes it unclear whether the dismissal of the
fraud claim was entirely because of the integration clause. Thus, under Chleborowicz it is
unclear whether a waiver of reliance clause is enough on its own to dismiss a fraud claim
based on extra-contractual statements.
26. Id. at *5.
27. Wedderburn Corp. v. Jetcraft Corp., No. 15 CVS 757, 2015 WL 6951549, at *1
(N.C. Business. Ct. Nov. 6, 2015) (unpublished).
28. Id.
29. Id.
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reason of the execution and delivery by Purchaser of this
Aircraft Delivery Receipt, it is conclusively presumed that (i)
Purchaser has approved and accepted the Aircraft and the
Aircraft Documents . . . “As Is, Where is” in its then current
technical condition and state of repair, with all faults,
limitations and defects (whether hidden or apparent),
regardless of cause; and (ii) except for Seller’s warranty of title
to the Aircraft contained in the [APA] and Warranty Bill of
Sale, Seller has not made with respect to the condition of the
Aircraft any representation, warranty or guaranty of any kind,
express or implied, whether arising in, law, in equity, in
contract, or in tort, including, without limitation, any implied
warranty of merchantability, airworthiness, design, condition,
or fitness for a particular use.30
Over the next few months, the corrections to the aircraft took
longer than expected.31 Plaintiff filed a fraud claim, alleging that
Defendant had knowingly made false statements as to the status of
the aircraft.32 Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint.33
The North Carolina Business Court granted Defendant’s motion
to dismiss on Plaintiff’s fraud claim.34 Citing to Chleborowicz and
Jackson v. Tim Maguire, Inc.,35 the court applied the analysis from
Ace and viewed the express language of the written agreement as
dispositive of the fraud claim.36 The following part of the opinion
illustrates this analysis:
After Defendant made the representations, Plaintiff signed the
Delivery Receipt and took delivery of the Aircraft. These
representations, made prior to Plaintiff’s execution of the
disclaimer contained in the Delivery Receipt in which Plaintiff
expressly acknowledged and agreed that Defendants had ‘not
made . . . any representation’, cannot support claims for fraud
or negligent misrepresentation.37

30. Id. at *2 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
31. Id. at *3.
32. Id. at *9.
33. Id. at *1.
34. Id. at *12.
35. 226 N.C. App. 583, 741 S.E.2d 514 (Apr. 16, 2013) (unpublished table decision),
2013 WL 1616031. Jackson also explicitly applies the standard from Ace to dismiss a fraud
claim at the summary judgment stage. Id. at *5.
36. Wedderburn Corp., 2015 WL 6951549, at *9.
37. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Jackson, 2013 WL 1616031, at *3–5; Chleborowicz v.
Johnson, 160 N.C. App. 250, 584 S.E.2d 108 (2003) (unpublished table decision), 2003 WL
21961386, at *3–4).
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Based on the court’s language, Wedderburn appears to extend
the Ace analysis to cases at the motion to dismiss stage, even though
the evidentiary standards at the motion to dismiss stage are
significantly different from the JNOV stage under which Ace was
decided. In North Carolina, a court deciding a motion to dismiss may
only consider the evidence of allegations contained within the
pleadings.38 Once a court begins to consider evidence outside of this
scope, “the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56.”39 Under these rules, at the
motion to dismiss stage as in Wedderburn, the only pieces of evidence
that the North Carolina Business Court had to consider were the
allegations contained in the pleadings and likely the actual written
agreement itself. Had the case proceeded to the summary judgment
or JNOV stages, the court would have been able to look outside of
the pleadings and consider “depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits.”40 Wedderburn
occurred at the opposite end of the procedural spectrum as Ace and
Chleborowicz, and therefore the court was not entitled to consider
evidence from discovery as the courts could in the earlier cases. Still,
the court chose to apply the same standard from Ace and hold that
waivers of reliance can effectively bar fraud claims based on extracontractual statements.
B.

The Vestlyn Lineage

The Vestlyn lineage illustrates North Carolina courts taking an
opposite approach to express disclaimers and refusing to allow these
contractual provisions to serve as complete defenses to fraud claims.
Adhering to a much different approach than the Wedderburn lineage,
the following line of case law appears conflicting and irreconcilable
with the Wedderburn lineage.
The case law supporting Vestlyn is based upon the rule that parol
evidence will be admitted to form the basis of a fraud claim.41 In
38. See Weaver v. St. Joseph of the Pines, Inc., 187 N.C. App. 198, 203–04, 652 S.E.2d
701, 707 (2007) (interpreting N.C. R. CIV. P. 12(b)).
39. N.C. R. CIV. P. 12(b).
40. N.C. R. CIV. P. 56. The gap between what is contained in the pleadings and what is
ascertainable through discovery raises questions as to whether courts should apply Ace at
the motion to dismiss stage. As was stated above, the court’s discussion of extrinsic
evidence of fraud in Chleborowicz makes the significance of evidence unclear, thus raising
questions as to the applicability of Ace at the motion to dismiss stage. See supra note 25.
41. See Fox v. S. Appliances, Inc., 264 N.C. 267, 270, 141 S.E.2d 522, 525 (1965) (citing
Anderson Cotton Mills v. Royal Mfg. Co., 218 N.C. 560, 11 S.E.2d 550 (1940); Hardware
Co. v. Kinion, 191 N.C. 218, 131 S.E. 579 (1926); Miller v. Howell, 184 N.C. 119, 113 S.E.
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Vestlyn, the North Carolina Business Court had the following
precedent at its disposal:
Where there is a claim for fraud in the inducement, defenses
based upon the fraudulently induced contract will not bar the
claim. . . . [P]arol evidence could be introduced in
contravention of an integration clause in a contract, where
there was fraud in the inducement, which ‘vitiates the
contract.’42
Thus, unlike the Wedderburn lineage, the Vestlyn line of cases uses a
standard that rejects the notion that waivers of reliance can serve as a
complete defense to fraud claims. Instead, the rule followed in the
Vestlyn lineage explicitly states that courts will consider extracontractual evidence in spite of contractual defenses, such as waivers
of reliance.
Vestlyn involved the sale of real property between two
corporations.43 The Sales Purchase Agreement (the “SPA”) involved
the sale of Plaintiffs’ interest in any land located in Jackson County,
North Carolina.44 The SPA provided Defendants with a due diligence
period of 44 days that would allow Defendants to inspect the property
as well as terminate the SPA at any point during that period.45
Defendants also agreed that it “ha[d] examined and underst[ood] the
operation and/or condition of the Property” and “ ‘ha[d] made such
examination of the operation, income and expenses of the Property,
as well as other matters and documents affecting or relating to this
transaction’ as it ‘deemed necessary.’ ”46 The SPA also contained an
integration clause that said the parties were only bound by the
provisions in the SPA and not by any statements made outside of the
contract.47

621 (1922); White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Bullock, 161 N.C. 1, 76 S.E. 634 (1912); Unitype
Co. v. Ashcraft Bros., 155 N.C. 63, 71 S.E. 61 (1911)); see also 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and
Deceit § 468, Westlaw (database updated May 2017).
42. Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. v. C-S Aviation Servs., 222 N.C. App. 834, 842, 733
S.E.2d 162, 169–70 (2012) (citing Laundry Mach. Co. v. Skinner, 225 N.C. 285, 288–89, 34
S.E.2d 190, 192–93 (1945)).
43. Vestlyn BMP, LLC v. Balsam Mountain Grp., LLC, No. 15 CVS 386, 2016 WL
3883652, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 22, 2016) (unpublished).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. (citations omitted).
47. Id. (“Seller shall not be bound in any manner whatsoever by any guarantees,
promises, projections, or other information . . . whether verbally or in writing, except as
expressly set forth in this Agreement.”)
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Following the transaction, Plaintiffs brought a breach of contract
claim against the Defendants.48 In response, Defendants filed a
counter-claim alleging that Plaintiffs made false extra-contractual
representations as to their ability to redevelop the land included in
the SPA into single or multi-family use.49 Plaintiffs, instead of arguing
that Defendant did not sufficiently allege fraud, simply contented that
the integration clause barred any reliance on representations made
outside the SPA.50 Defendants alleged that “circumstances
surrounding the transaction ‘induced [Defendant] to forego
additional investigation’ of the misrepresentation,” and so they were
entitled to rely on Plaintiffs’ representations outside of the SPA.51
The court held that the disclaimers in the SPA did not serve as
complete defenses to the fraud claim.52 Instead, the court applied the
standard from the Vestlyn lineage and allowed evidence outside of the
contract to be used as the basis for a fraud claim.53 The Vestlyn court
distinguished the case from the Wedderburn lineage by arguing that
Ace and Chleborowicz took place at later stages of litigation than the
motion to dismiss stage, and that the consideration of evidence at
these stages required a different standard to be used for evaluating
extra-contractual evidence than in 12(b)(6) proceedings.54 However,
in distinguishing itself from Ace and the cases that followed in that
lineage, the court did not discuss Wedderburn.55 The failure to discuss
Wedderburn makes the court’s distinction between the Wedderburn
and Vestlyn lineages unclear. Both cases were decided at the motion
to dismiss stage. If, as the court explained in Vestlyn, the rule for
determining which of the two lineages applies is based on the
procedural stage, then Wedderburn and Vestlyn should have been
decided in the same manner. Instead, Wedderburn and Vestlyn were
decided in the same procedural stage, but the court applied different
lineages and had opposite findings regarding the effectiveness of
waivers of reliance. As a result, the distinction between the two
lineages that is drawn by the court in Vestlyn, taken in consideration
48. Id. at *1.
49. Id. at *6.
50. Id.
51. Id. (alteration in original).
52. Id. at *7–8 (citing Fox v. S. Appliances, Inc., 264 N.C. 267, 270, 141 S.E.2d 522, 525
(1965); Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. v. C-S Aviation Servs., 222 N.C. App. 834, 842–45, 733
S.E.2d 162, 169–71 (2012); Parker v. Bennett, 32 N.C. App. 46, 50, 231 S.E.2d 10, 13
(1977)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at *8
55. Id. (distinguishing the case from cases within the Wedderburn lineage but not
discussing Wedderburn).

95 N.C. L. REV. 1767 (2017)

1776

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

with the differing rulings in Vestlyn and Wedderburn, demonstrates
the seeming incompatibility of the two lineages.
II. THE PROBLEM THESE LINEAGES HAVE CREATED
The North Carolina Business Court was created in part to
“establish a body of case law to serve as guidance on business issues
to the business community.”56 This goal allows North Carolina to
develop a better business culture,57 much like what Delaware
accomplished through the establishment of its Court of Chancery.
The current incompatibility of the Wedderburn lineage and the
Vestlyn lineage does not serve that goal.
The two lines of cases appear irreconcilable for courts that are
handling fraud claims at the motion to dismiss stage in cases where
there is a written agreement that contains an express waiver of
reliance on extra-contractual provisions. Because the Vestlyn court
distinguishes itself from Ace on procedural grounds, whereas
Wedderburn was decided in the same procedural stage and did apply
the standard from Ace, it is unclear when each lineage applies. The
opposite rulings in these two cases force North Carolina courts
deciding cases at the motion to dismiss stage to choose between the
two seemingly contradictory standards with no guidance for which
standard is correct.58 Because there is no explanation for the differing
rulings, North Carolina courts are left with two incompatible lines of
cases.
The conflict between Vestlyn and Wedderburn presents an
obvious issue for businesses and contract drafters in determining how
to protect themselves from litigation. On one hand, Wedderburn
dictates that as long as an agreement contains the proper disclaimer,
defendants should not worry about the prospect of discovery or trial
because fraud claims will likely be dismissed at the motion to dismiss

56. Carrie A. O’Brien, Note, The North Carolina Business Court: North Carolina’s
Special Superior Court for Complex Business Cases, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 367, 376 (2002)
(citing Interview with Judge Ben Tennille, Special Superior Court Judge for Complex
Business Cases, in Greensboro, N.C. (Jan. 14, 2001)).
57. Id. at 374–75.
58. Although there are factual differences between the two cases, Vestlyn does not
explain how a court might interpret an integration clause differently based on the
underlying facts of a case. For example, there is nothing to indicate the non-reliance
provision was enforced differently in Vestlyn because Vestlyn involved a real estate
transaction while Wedderburn involved a personal property transaction. See Vestlyn, 2016
WL 3883652, at *7–8.
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stage.59 However, Vestlyn holds the opposite—that no matter what
kind of waiver is contained within an agreement, it will be vitiated at
the motion to dismiss phase by mere allegations of fraud, and all of
the extra-contractual statements that the parties agreed to keep out
will be allowed in as evidence, following an expensive discovery
process.60 Rather than attempt to decide which one of these opposing
approaches may be better, North Carolina should not follow either
line of cases. Instead, the courts and legislature should explore
alternative solutions.
III. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
The creation and execution of agreements must be a process in
which parties have a clear understanding of how they can protect
themselves from lawsuits. Without that clarity, businesses in North
Carolina will be open to lawsuits they agreed to preclude. There are
multiple alternatives to the current standards that could provide this
certainty. One potential solution is to allow courts to weigh factors
when determining the enforceability of an integration clause.
Alternatively, the legislature could develop contractual provisions
that—when placed into certain written agreements—could be utilized
as complete defenses to fraud claims. A similar alternative would be
allowing the legislature to create specific rules or templates for how
parties can write enforceable integration clauses into their contracts.
Overall, any of these alternatives would be preferable to the current
standard, where parties to a contract are forced to guess what lineage
of case law a court will choose to apply when interpreting their
contract.
A. Factor Tests
Disclaimers in contracts need to be given force in certain
situations. Other jurisdictions have grappled with this contention
when handling fraud claims. The Court of Appeals of New York aptly
summarized this issue when it stated:
If the language here used is not sufficient to estop a party from
claiming that he entered the contract because of fraudulent
representations, then no language can accomplish that purpose.
To hold otherwise would be to say that it is impossible for two
businessmen dealing at arm’s length to agree that the buyer is
59. See Wedderburn Corp. v. Jetcraft Corp., No. 15 CVS 757, 2015 WL 6951549, at *9
(N.C. Business Ct. Nov. 6, 2015) (unpublished).
60. See Vestlyn, 2016 WL 3883652, at *7–8.
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not buying in reliance on any representations of the seller as to
a particular fact.61
Contractual provisions like integration clauses will be rendered
meaningless if they cannot prevent the very thing that they are
constructed to protect against. There is also an irony to the idea that
disclaimers cannot afford a defense to fraud claims. If a purchaser
signs an agreement confirming that he did not rely on representations
outside of the agreement, then he is “perpetrating [his] own fraud” by
bringing the fraud claim.62 However, that is not to say that a court
must apply the standard from the Wedderburn lineage in all scenarios.
For example, in basic consumer contracts where the consumer is
generally vastly less sophisticated than the seller of the product, it
would be against the public’s interest to always bind the consumer to
the boilerplate language of a contract’s integration clause if the
contract was procured by fraud.63 In order to avoid these issues, other
jurisdictions have held that rather than always enforcing or always
ignoring disclaimers, the best approach may be to consider several
factors surrounding the agreement before making the decision to
enforce or ignore specific terms.64
In Barr v. Dyke,65 the Supreme Court of Maine developed a
factor test that allows the court to evaluate the circumstances that
give rise to the alleged fraudulently induced agreement.66 The court
listed the following factors as necessary considerations when deciding
upon the enforceability of disclaimers:

61. Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 600 (N.Y. 1959).
62. Andrew M. Zeitlin & Alison P. Baker, At Liberty to Lie? The Viability of Fraud
Claims after Disclaiming Reliance, ABA, BUS. TORTS LITIG. COMM., (Spring 2013),
http://www.shipmangoodwin.com/files/21504_BUS_Article_Reprint.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8XU3-TFNB] (citing Danann Realty Corp., 157 N.E.2d at 600).
63. Delaware courts, for example, have already recognized that there is a need to
distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated parties when determining whether
to enforce a waiver of reliance. Progressive Int'l Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
2002 WL 1558382, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2002) (stating that there is a greater presumption
to bind parties by contractual terms if the parties are sophisticated).
64. See Barr v. Dyke, 2012 ME 108, ¶ 27, 49 A.3d 1280, 1289–90 (Me. 2012)
(establishing six factors to consider when determining the enforceability of disclaimers
when allegations of fraud exist); Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. América Móvil,
S.A.B. de C.V., 952 N.E.2d 995, 1001–02 (N.Y. 2011) (analyzing through a fact-based
approach and applying factors such as sophistication of parties); Forest Oil Corp. v.
McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 60 (Tex. 2008) (clarifying which factors are to determine whether
a disclaimer is enforceable).
65. 2012 ME 108, 49 A.3d 1280 (Me. 2012).
66. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 27, 49 A.3d at 1289.
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(1) Whether the complaining party was advised by counsel; (2)
Whether the terms of the agreement were negotiated and not
boilerplate; (3) Whether the transaction was an arm’s-length
transaction; (4) Whether the parties were knowledgeable in
business matters; (5) Whether the language of the clause was
clear; and (6) Whether, if litigation was against a fiduciary, the
adversarial relationship of the parties demonstrated an absence
of trust between the parties that negated any claim of
reasonable reliance. 67
These factors allow courts to evaluate agreements with a more
nuanced approach. For example, the presence of counsel speaks to
whether or not the playing field is level. Without counsel, a party may
not be operating with a full understanding of the transaction.68
Whether or not the contractual provisions were negotiated or
boilerplate is important to consider because it arguably reflects a
clearer intent of the parties.69 Factors three, four, and five of the Barr
test all speak to the relationship of the parties and the ability of each
to understand the ins and outs of the transaction.70 While these
factors taken together might not be wholly representative of all the
considerations that should be made in North Carolina courts, they do
demonstrate an efficient list of things to consider when evaluating
whether or not to enforce the contract exactly as it appears in writing.
In Barr, the Supreme Court of Maine provides an example of the
test being used while evaluating the enforceability of a waiver of
reliance clause.71 In Barr, Plaintiffs were minority stockholders in a
company that brought legal action against Defendants, the company’s
directors, for breach of fiduciary duty.72 The parties resolved this
dispute by reaching an agreement for Plaintiffs to sell their shares.73
This agreement contained a provision stating that Plaintiffs had
independently conducted a valuation of the company and that
Plaintiffs had not relied on any representations made by Defendants
when conducting this assessment.74 Plaintiffs later filed a complaint
against Defendants, alleging that they had been fraudulently induced

67. Id.
68. See Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A., 952 N.E.2d at 1001–02.
69. See Forest Oil Corp., 268 S.W.3d at 60 (referring to negotiated terms as something
that the parties specifically discussed during negotiations).
70. See Barr, 2012 ME 108, ¶ 27, 49 A.3d at 1289–90.
71. Id.
72. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 3, 49 A.3d at 1283.
73. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 4, 49 A.3d at 1283.
74. Id., 49 A.3d at 1283–84.

95 N.C. L. REV. 1767 (2017)

1780

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

into entering the agreement.75 The court granted summary judgment
in favor of Defendants, and Plaintiffs appealed.76
The Supreme Court of Maine affirmed summary judgment for
Defendants after evaluating the agreement under the factors test
listed above.77 The court made the following statements regarding
each factor:
The summary judgment record demonstrates the following: the
language of the disclaimer was clear; there is no pending
allegation or proof of fraud that falls outside the scope of that
disclaimer; Barr and Warren were businessmen who were
familiar with the company and obtained or had the opportunity
to obtain their own independent evaluation of the value of the
stock; all parties were represented by counsel; the settlement’s
terms were negotiated at arm’s length; and by the time the
parties settled the pending lawsuit, there was no relationship of
trust between the parties notwithstanding the preexisting
fiduciary duties of the officers and directors.78
Here the court enforced the integration clause in part based on
the status of the parties, noting that the parties were businesspeople
with knowledge of the company.79 Through this, the court showed
that this was not a commercial contract of adhesion or an agreement
in which “rigid enforcement of disclaimer-of-reliance clauses . . .
may be inappropriate.”80 Instead, the court emphasized that in
agreements between more knowledgeable and experienced parties
like the businessmen in Barr, failing to enforce contracts’ integration
clauses will “ ‘grievously impair[]’ freedom of contract.”81 This
language is a good example of how a Court weighs one of these
factors and considers it in the greater context of contracts principles.
While none of the factors listed above are dispositive,82 each of
them—like in the above analysis—may provide a court the avenue for
considering the effect that enforcement of agreements may have on
contracts law.
Other courts have employed similar approaches using factor
tests. For example, New York courts use a three factor test to
75. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 6, 49 A.3d at 1284.
76. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 10–11, 49 A.3d. at 1285.
77. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 33, 49 A.3d at 1291.
78. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 29, 49 A.3d at 1290.
79. Id.
80. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 18, 49 A.3d at 1287.
81. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 24, 49 A.3d at 1288 (quoting Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268
S.W.3d 51, 61 (Tex. 2008) (alterations in original)).
82. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 27, 49 A.3d at 1289–90.
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determine whether to enforce an integration clause that includes: “(1)
whether the complaining party was a corporation and was advised by
counsel; (2) whether the complaining party knew that existing
information had not been provided as of the time of settlement; and
(3) whether fraud separate from the fraud settled through the release
can be established.”83 Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court has also
applied a factor test when evaluating the enforceability of contractual
disclaimers.84 While these individual factor tests may not use the exact
factors that should be applied in North Carolina, they are good
examples of functional approaches employed in other jurisdictions.
Using a factor test gives courts flexibility when making decisions
regarding whether or not to enforce an integration clause that
prevents a fraud claim. However, a factor test can also have negative
consequences by compromising predictability in courts’ decisionmaking as compared to a bright-line rule. Any factor test will provide
a nuanced approach to the enforceability of agreements, which can
hamper parties’ ability to predict how a court may rule. Predictability
is an important concern for the North Carolina Business Court, as the
current problem is the lack of consistency and predictability under
Wedderburn and Vestlyn. Easily identifiable factors could create more
predictability compared to other factor tests by allowing for
transparency and providing parties to a contract with a road map for
how the court will make its decision. Additionally, assigning
particular levels of weight to each factor or reducing the number of
factors would help to quell concerns that a factor test would create
more unpredictability.85 Ultimately, a factor test, while sacrificing a
bit in predictability, would provide a better alternative to the current
problems caused by the Wedderburn and Vestlyn lineages.86
B.

Boilerplate Contractual Provisions

In addition to a factor test, North Carolina law suggests that
there may be a way for the legislature to develop certain contractual
83. 2012 ME 108, ¶ 23, 49 A.3d at 1288 (citing Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v.
América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 952 N.E.2d 995, 1001–03 (N.Y. 2011)).
84. See Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 61 (Tex. 2008) (citing
Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1997)).
85. See Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571, 579 (2008)
(arguing that an advantage to using a factor test with only two factors is a greater ability to
determine the weight and strength of the factors individually).
86. Sheri P. Adler, Note, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Usury Challenge: A
Multi-Factor Approach, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 329, 356–57 (arguing that a factors test is
not a “talisman of magical power,” but that it can provide a “source of helpful guidance.”
(quoting Dillin v. United States, 433 F.2d 1097, 1100 (5th Cir. 1970))).
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provisions that can serve as complete defenses to fraud claims. In the
context of business contracts, the legislature has taken steps to control
the enforceability of attorney’s fee claims, including when they are
enforceable and exactly how they must be signed.87 Based on the
legislature’s existing willingness to control certain parts of contract
drafting, the legislature could pass statutes with boilerplate
contractual provisions and instruct that they serve as complete
defenses to fraud claims. For example, one of the provisions may
appear as such: “I hereby waive any reliance on any representation
that was made outside of the contract. The entire agreement is
contained in the express language of this written agreement. By
signing this agreement, I am waiving my right to pursue a fraud claim
based on this agreement.” While this language may not be what the
legislature would adopt, it expresses the general aim of these
provisions: to put parties on notice that once the agreement is signed,
extra-contractual fraud is no longer a viable legal claim.
However, this approach may give rise to many of the same issues
that exist under the current system. One concern is the type of
pressure it puts on contract drafters to create provisions that courts
will actually enforce. For example, some courts may only enforce
non-reliance disclaimers when they are specific enough.88 The
solution to this problem would be, as stated above, to have the
legislature adopt exact language that when put into a contract would
completely prevent a fraud claim. However, this would lead to
another concern regarding how to protect less experienced consumers
when these types of provisions are in play. For example, a party with
no understanding of contract language may not understand the
consequences of signing a contract with this type of provision, and
then that party would have no remedy if there was genuine fraud in
the transaction. A possible solution to this issue would be to only
allow these fraud defense provisions to be effective under certain
conditions.89 This would allow waivers of reliance to be utilized only
when the parties are operating in a context appropriate for that level
of contract enforcement, such as when the parties are more
sophisticated or experienced contract drafters. The definitions of
“business contract” and “consumer contract” already contained in
North Carolina law may provide helpful guidance for establishing

87. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.6 (2015).
88. See Caiolo v. Citibank, N.A., New York, 295 F.3d 312, 330 (2d Cir. 2002).
89. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.6(a)–(e) (2015) (establishing defined categories of
contracts and when attorney’s fees provisions can be employed in each).
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where enforcing waivers of reliance is appropriate.90 If the legislature
were to limit the enforceability of waiver of reliance provisions to
“business contracts,” that could ensure less sophisticated parties
would not be without recourse if they were defrauded in a consumer
transaction.
While both of these solutions are adoptable together, either one
would aid North Carolina in taking a positive step from the current
problem. Both the factor test and the boilerplate contract provision
are alternatives to the current Wedderburn/Vestlyn dichotomy that
would give contract drafters a clearer understanding of what will be
enforced by the courts. Implementing either of these solutions would
increase the predictability and consistency in North Carolina courts’
application of integration clauses to fraud claims.
CONCLUSION
The differing lineages of Wedderburn and Vestlyn illustrate an
unclear conflict in North Carolina contract law. Businesses and
practitioners have little reason to feel confident that their express
written agreements will have any force when combating claims for
fraud, even when the agreements contain waivers of reliance.
However, there may be a way to resolve this conflict and adopt a
more comprehensive standard that allows courts to be flexible in how
they analyze fraud claims. North Carolina needs a balance between
honoring the power of express agreements and protecting
inexperienced consumers. Through the adoption of a factor test or
statutory boilerplate contractual provisions, North Carolina might be
able to chart a more predictable standard for businesses and
practitioners.
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